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Abstract
We examine the problem of measuring inﬂuence based on the information con-
tained in the data on the communications between scholarly publications, ju-
dicial decisions, patents, web pages, and other entities. The measurement
of inﬂuence is useful to address several empirical questions such as reputa-
tion, prestige, aspects of the diﬀusion of knowledge, the markets for scientists
and scientiﬁc publications, the dynamics of innovation, ranking algorithms of
search engines in the World Wide Web, and others. In this paper we ask why
any given methodology is reasonable and informative applying the axiomatic
method. We ﬁnd that a unique ranking method can be characterized by means
of ﬁve axioms: anonymity, invariance to citation intensity, weak homogeneity,
weak consistency, and invariance to splitting of journals. This method is easily
implementable and turns out to be diﬀerent from those regularly used in social
and natural sciences, arts and humanities, and computer science.
∗We thank Yiu T. Poon and participants in seminars at Brown, Iowa State, and the University of
British Columbia for very helpful comments. We also thank Debora Lewi and Salwa Hammami for their
research assistance.
†Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Email: ipalacios@brown.edu.
http:// www.econ.brown.edu/˜ iph.
‡Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011, USA. Email: oscar@volij.co.il.
http://volij.co.il.
11 Introduction
The quality of scientists’ research, publications, and achievements plays an important role
in the reward and productivity structures within academia. These structures have been
the subject of keen interest to economists, sociologists, historians of science, and other
scientists. Of particular interest to economists have been the determinants of scholarly
productivity, the role of incentives as promoters of the growth of knowledge, and the
implications of competition among scientists within the structure of rewards.
Academic journals have played an increasingly important role in both the dissemination
of new knowledge and the certiﬁcation of scientiﬁc merit throughout the past century, in
economics as in other disciplines. In an attempt to judge the various qualities of scientiﬁc
publications, several eﬀorts have been made to measure inﬂuence. Citations, as a broad
form of inﬂuence, are often used in these eﬀorts.
Not only do citations ﬁgure prominently in scholarly journals and books, but they also
appear in many other forms of documentation, such as patents, newspapers, legal opinions,
magazine articles, and in the link structure of the World Wide Web. The literature on
citation analysis is by now vast and growing.1 Citation analysis is growing mainly because
it enables, at a relatively low cost, to make a ﬁrst attempt at rigorously quantifying elusive
but important socioeconomic phenomena such as reputation, inﬂuence, prestige, celebrity,
the diﬀusion of knowledge, the quality of scholarly output, the quality of journals, the
rise and decline of journals and schools of thought, changes in the publishing process
and in the incentives for publication, the returns to publication, the basing of judicial
decisions on previous decisions, and the productivity of scholars, judges, and academic
departments.2 Patents also contain citation references to previous patents, which allow
1See Posner (2000) and many references therein.
2For example, citations have been used to examine the distribution of inﬂuence across journals and
changes in this distribution; the extent to which the status of a journal leads to a lengthening of the
review process; changes in quality standards and in the distribution of quality in response to increased
competition, and other aspects of the publication process (Ellison (2000b)). Citations are also relevant for
examining tradeoﬀs associated with diﬀerent aspects of paper quality, including the role of social norms
for weighing diﬀerent aspects of quality (Ellison (2000a)); the extent of favoritism on the part of editors
(Laband and Piette (1994a)); the incentive for authors to publish, including the monetary value to article
publication in terms of direct salary increments, promotion-related salary increments, faculty mobility,
and life-cycle productivity proﬁles (Tuckman and Leahey (1975), Hammermesh, Johnson, and Weisbrod
(1982)); the beneﬁts of intellectual collaboration (Laband and Tollison (2000)), and the extent to which
2one to trace links across inventions. In the literature on the dynamics of innovation and
technological change, patent citation data are used for examining the pattern of knowledge
spillovers and evaluating the importance of private and governing patenting (see Jaﬀe and
Trajtenberg (2002)). Citation analysis also plays an important role in the World Wide
Web in the analysis of “links,” where search engines combine sophisticated text matching
techniques with a vast link structure to create web search algorithms that ﬁnd and rank
pages according to their importance. Last, but not least, citation analysis also is used
widely as a management tool for making decisions on hiring, promotion, salary, and other
personnel decisions.
The use of citation analysis is so extensive that “counting citations is already a well-
established method of empirical research in law, economics, sociology, and academic ad-
ministration” (Posner (2000), p. 382, italics added). We emphasize the word “counting”
because it captures the basis of this methodology. Within our discipline, for instance,
several studies have approximated productivity, quality, and inﬂuence by simple citation
counts. These counts are then often used to examine various questions of interest such as
those mentioned in footnote 2. However, the use of citation counts must be approached
with caution. A principal criticism is that the number of citations may be a poor proxy
of what is really of interest, whether it is reputation, inﬂuence, impact, or the quality and
magnitude of a person’s achievement.
Some studies attempt to account for this criticism by weighting citations in certain
intuitive but ad hoc ways. For instance, the general idea in the evaluation of journals
and other scholarly publications is that citations by low impact journals should be given
less credit than citations by high impact journals. As a result, there are several arbitrary
methods to produce a ranking of journals. For instance, many studies use the “impact
factor” constructed by the Social Science Citation Index and published by the Institute
for Scientiﬁc Information, while others follow Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) who proposed
academic scientists receive diﬀerential returns to publishing articles of varying quality (Sauer (1988)).
Citations are also useful to examine the relationship between scholarly signiﬁcance, academic status, and
public fame (Posner (2001)). In the legal profession, citation analysis is extensive. These include studies
of judicial citation practices, judicial inﬂuence and legal precedent (Landes, Lessig, and Solimine (1998),
Landes and Posner (1976)), the role of citations both to and in judicial opinions in adjudication and legal
decision making, the productivity and inﬂuence of judges, the durability of precedents, and the rankings
of scholars, books, journals, and schools. See, for instance, the legal citation studies in the conference
volume “Interpreting Legal Citations” (Journal of Legal Studies, supplement, (2000)).
3various “impact-adjusted” methods for ranking journals. Over the last few years, several
variations of these methods and others have been applied extensively in many studies in
diﬀerent disciplines.
Given the proliferation of rankings, and the important role that they often seem to play
in personnel decisions and in the study of many socioeconomic phenomena of interest, it
is somewhat surprising that neither the authors that propose these ranking methods nor
those who use them, have tried to justify them.3 In other words, given that there is, in
principle, a plethora of diﬀerent arbitrary ranking methods, there is no obvious reason
why one should prefer one method over another. Adopting a method because it looks
reasonable or because it yields introspectively intuitive results is, to say the least, not the
best scientiﬁc practice. Without investigating the properties of these methods it is simply
not possible to establish a reliably meaningful measure of impact or intellectual inﬂuence.
Posner (2000, p. 383) summarizes these criticisms by indicating that “citation analysis
is not an inherently economic methodology; most of it has been conducted without any
use of the theories or characteristic techniques of economists.” The result is that, in terms
of quality, the information content of the network of journals, publications, and all other
forms of documentation that play a paramount role in the exchange, dissemination, and
certiﬁcation of scientiﬁc knowledge is little understood. This, in turn, has implications for
all the empirical applications mentioned above.
In this paper we bring economic methodology to bear on the ranking problem. Specif-
ically, we apply the axiomatic method often used in social choice, game theory, and other
areas, and present an axiomatic model for measuring intellectual inﬂuence.4 Thus, the
approach we take is diﬀerent from that in the literature. Rather than assuming arbitrarily
a ranking method on intuitive grounds or introspection, we derive a ranking method by
3For instance, Bush, Hamelman, and Staaf (1974), Borokhovich, Bricker, Brunarski, and Simkins
(1995), Dusansky and Vernon (1998), Laband and Piette (1994b), Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and Stengos
(2001), and many others only describe the method they use, or simply adopt previous methods, and report
the resulting rankings. Liebowitz and Palmer (1984), claim that their ranking “probably comes closest to
an ideal measure of the impact ...of manuscripts published in v arious journals,” and that their ranking
is probably “the closest to ‘journal quality’.” However, no justiﬁcation whatsoever is provided for any of
these statements.
4Arrow’s impossibility theorem, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, Nash’s derivation of the Nash bargain-
ing solution, Harsanyi’s characterization of the utilitarian social welfare function, Peleg’s characterization
of the core, and Segal’s (2000) characterization of the relative utilitarian social preference are just a few
examples of the successful application of the axiomatic method.
4requiring a few simple properties. The main result of the analysis is that there is a unique
ranking method that satisﬁes the proposed properties simultaneously. As it turns out, this
method is diﬀerent from the ones typically used in economics and other sciences to rank
journals and departments, and to measure productivity, inﬂuence, and prestige. Moreover,
it is easily implementable.
We examine the following properties in the context of the ranking of journals and other
scholarly publications. The ﬁrst is the anonymity of the method. Roughly, a ranking
method is anonymous if it does not depend on the names of the journals under considera-
tion. The second property, which we call invariance to citation intensity, requires that the
absolute number of references a journal cites should not aﬀect the ranking of the journals,
as long as the distribution of these references does not change. A citing article awards
value to the articles it cites. This value, which depends exclusively on the content of a
paper, is distributed among the cited articles. Thus, the longer the list of the references,
the smaller the value awarded to each cited reference. In other words, given the content of
the paper, the total value awarded to the articles it cites cannot be increased or decreased
by changing the amount of references. The third property concerns the ratio of mutual
citations. This property, which we call weak homogeneity, i sb a s e do nS t i g l e r ,S t i g l e r ,a n d
Friedland (1995), who stress that an important measure of the impact of one journal on
another is the ratio of citations of one journal by the other to the citations of the latter
to the former.5 This property requires that in certain two-journal problems, the ratio of
the journals’ valuations be in a ﬁxed proportion to the ratio of their mutual citations.
The fourth property we consider is weak consistency, which allows us to extend a ranking
method from problems with few journals to problems with more journals. The idea be-
hind this property is that if we know how to rank a small problem, we should be able to
extend the ranking method to a big problem in a consistent way. We follow the notion of
consistency that has been applied for axiomatizing rules and solution concepts in diverse
problems.6 Finally, the last axiom, which we call Invariance to splitting of journals,r e -
5Stigler, Stigler, and Friedland (1995) also show that an advantage of these ratios is that it is possible
to ﬁt a statistical model to the data in terms of simple univariate scores. See also Stigler (1994) for an
application of the model to journals in statistics and their relationship with econometrics and economics.
6For example, Peleg and Tijs (1996) characterize the Nash equilibrium correspondence, Lensberg (1988)
axiomatizes the Nash bargaining solution, Peleg (1985), (1986) characterize the core of NTU and TU games
respectively, Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) axiomatize the Shapley value, and Dagan (1994) characterizes the
5quires that the splitting of a journal into several identical but smaller journals does not
aﬀect the ranking.
We show that these ﬁve properties characterize a unique ranking method of journals
based on their per-manuscript impact. We call this method the Invariant method, and
it turns out that it is diﬀerent from the methods regularly used to evaluate scholarly
publications and academic departments, judicial inﬂuence, rank web pages, and measure
reputation, inﬂuence, and prestige.
Our purpose in this paper is not to claim that any given ranking method based on
citations is the correct way of measuring impact, much less quality. Citation analyses,
however sophisticated it may be, cannot be a substitute for critical reading and expert
judging. However, to the extent that the data on the communication between scholarly
publications, judicial decisions, patents, web pages, etc., contain valuable information that
can be used to address several empirical questions of interest in diﬀerent disciplines and
types of problems, we should ask why a method is reasonable and informative. We thus
evaluate this question by characterizing and comparing diﬀerent methods according to the
properties they satisfy and those they fail to satisfy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic problem of
ranking journals according to the average impact of each of its articles and characterizes
a ranking method by means of ﬁve independent properties. In Section 3 we illustrate the
use of these methods with a simple example. Using the citations by articles published in
the year 2000 we measure the impact of the articles published during the period 1993-1999
in a set of economics journals. The example shows that diﬀerences in the measurement of
impact according to diﬀerent methods can be substantial. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Intellectual Inﬂuence of a Publication
In what follows we will use the terms “manuscript” and “journal” to refer to the unit of
publication and to the aggregation of these units, respectively. As indicated above, other
interpretations can be given to the problem of measuring inﬂuence based on communica-
Walrasian correspondence in the context of private ownership economies. In these papers and many others
consistency plays a crucial role. Thomson (1990), (2000) oﬀers comprehensive surveys on consistency and
its applications.
6tion data depending on the speciﬁc application. We thus analyze the problem of ranking
journals according to their impact, as measured by the citations their articles generate. We
shall be dealing with ranking methods which are functions that take some data as input
and return a vector of valuations as output. These valuations should be interpreted as the
relative values of the representative articles published in these journals.
2.1 Characterization
Let J be a nonempty set of journals. This set is to be interpreted as the universe of all
potential journals. For each i ∈J and for each ti ∈ I N,w es a yt h a t( i,ti) is a replica of
i. We assume that J is closed under replication. That is, if i belongs to J then so do
all its replicas. Let J ⊆J be a subset of journals. A citation matrix for J is a |J|×| J|
non-negative matrix (cij) where for each i,j ∈ J, cij is the number of citations to journal
i by journal j.F o rj ∈ J,w ed e n o t eb y¯ cj the vector (cij)i∈J of citations by journal j,a n d
the sum of all citations by journal j is denoted by cj,n a m e l ycj =
 
i∈J cij. All vectors are
column vectors. For a vector v,  v  denotes the 1-norm of v,n a m e l y v  =
 
i∈J |vi|.T h e
diagonal matrix with d1,...,d n as its main diagonal entries is denoted by diag(d1,...,d n).
Given a matrix of citations C =( cij), we deﬁne D =d i a g ( cj)j∈J to be the diagonal matrix
with the sums of the citations by the journals as its main diagonal. Further, the matrix
CD−1 will be called the normalized matrix of C and it is readily seen to be a stochastic
matrix (the entries of each of its columns add up to one).
Given a matrix of citations C for J, we say that journal i is cited by journal j if cij > 0.
We say that journal i impacts journal j if there is a ﬁnite sequence i0,...i n,w i t hi0 = i
and in = j, such that for all t =1 ,...,n, journal it−1, is cited by journal it. Journals i
and j communicate if either i = j or if they impact each other. It is easy to see that the
communication relation is an equivalence relation and, therefore, it partitions the set J of
journals into equivalence classes, which we call communication classes. A discipline is a
communication class J  ⊆ J such that no journal in J \J  impacts any journal inside J .I f
am a t r i xo fc i t a t i o n sC has two disciplines, this means that there are two communication
classes in J that are disconnected. Namely, there is no chain of citations that go from a
journal in one discipline to a journal in another and vice versa. Since we are interested in
rankings within a single discipline, we will restrict attention to citation matrices with only
7one discipline.7 This leads to the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 A ranking problem is a triple  J,a,C  where J ⊆Jis a set of journals,
a =( ai)i∈J is the vector of number of articles they published, and C =( cij)(i,j)∈J×J is a
citation matrix for J with only one discipline.
The primitives of a ranking problem consist of the relevant set of journals, the number
of articles in each journal, and the corresponding matrix of citations. Clearly, the choice
of the relevant set of journals will generally aﬀect the results of the implementation of a
ranking method. Thus, it is important to make a good choice of journals. In our analysis,
however, we take as given the set of journals, and just deal with the problem of measuring
inﬂuence within this set.
There is a class of problems that will play an important role in our analysis, those
in which every journal has the same number of articles, or isoarticle problems for short.
These problems will also be helpful for illustration purposes.
We are interested in building a cardinal ranking of the journals in J, namely a non-zero
vector of non-negative valuations (vj)j∈J.E a c h vj is to be interpreted as the value of a
representative article in journal i. Since only relative values matter, we can normalize
the vector of valuations so that they add up to 1. Denote the set of all possible vectors
of valuations of J by ∆J. That is, ∆J = {(vj)j∈J : vj ≥ 0,
 
j∈J vj =1 }. Further,
∆=∪J⊆J∆J.
Deﬁnition 2 Let R be the set of all ranking problems. A ranking method is a function
φ : R→∆, that assigns to each ranking problem  J,a,C  a vector of valuations v ∈ ∆J.
Given a vector (ai)i∈J of number of articles, we will denote by A the diagonal matrix
diag(ai)i∈J.T h e s ea r es o m ee x a m p l e so fd i ﬀ e r e n tr a n k i n gm e t h o d s .
7Citation matrices with only one discipline are known in the language of matrix theory, as non-negative,
irreducible matrices.
8Examples:
1. The Egalitarian method is the function that assigns the same value to every journal.
Formally, φE : R→∆i sd e ﬁ n e db yφE(J,a,C)=( 1 /|J|,...,1/|J|)T.
2. The Counting method awards each journal the proportion of its citations out of
the total number of citations. Formally: φC : R→∆i sd e ﬁ n e db yφC(J,a,C)=
(
 
j∈J cij/ai  
j∈J cj/aj )i∈J.
3. The Modiﬁed Counting method awards each journal the proportion of its non-self-
citations out of the total number of non-self-citations. Formally: φMC : R→∆i s
deﬁned by φMC(J,a,C)=(
 




4. The Liebowitz-Palmer method φLP : R→∆ assigns to each ranking problem R =
 J,a,C  the only ﬁxed point of the operator T :∆ J → ∆J deﬁned by T(v)= A−1Cv
 A−1Cv .
5. The Invariant method φI assigns to each ranking problem R =  J,a,C , the unique
member of v ∈ ∆J that satisﬁes CD−1Av = Av.
The Counting method was ﬁrst used in Bush, Hamelman, and Staaf (1974).8 This
method was later used by Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) (see their Table 2, column 2
(Rankings Based on Citations Per Article)). The Modiﬁed Counting method was used in
Bush, Hamelman, and Staaf (1974) (see their Table 1, column “Diagonal Excluded”). As
to the Liebowitz-Palmer method, it was proposed by Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) and
used in the construction of the journal ranking that appears in their Table 2, column 4
(Rankings Based on Impact Adjusted Citations Per Article). To the best of our knowledge,
neither the Egalitarian method nor the Invariant method have ever been used for ranking
journals or other publications in any discipline.
The reader may wonder whether the Liebowitz-Palmer and the Invariant methods are
well-deﬁned. After all, the operator that is used to deﬁne the Liebowitz-Palmer method
may have more than one ﬁxed point, and the equation that deﬁnes the Invariant method
may not have a unique solution. That the Invariant method is well-deﬁned follows from
the fact that the normalized matrix CD−1 is an irreducible stochastic matrix and that
8Although these authors do not assign numerical values to each of the journals they consider, the overall
journal ranking in their Table 1, column “Diagonal Included” is built based on the Counting method.
9every irreducible stochastic matrix has a unique invariant distribution. The fact that the
Liebowitz-Palmer method is well deﬁned is a corollary of the Perron-Frobenius theorem
for irreducible matrices. Speciﬁcally, note that φLP(J,a,C) is a characteristic vector in
∆J of the non-negative and irreducible matrix A−1C.9 One of the results of the Perron-
Frobenius theory is that every irreducible, non-negative, |J|×| J| matrix M has exactly
one eigenvector in ∆J (see Minc (1988), Theorem 4.4). Therefore, the Liebowitz-Palmer
method can be deﬁned alternatively as assigning to each ranking problem  J,a,C  the only
eigenvector of A−1C in ∆J. Incidentally, what Liebowitz and Palmer (1984), Laband and
Piette (1994b), and other papers that use the Liebowitz-Palmer method actually do is to
calculate the eigenvector by means of an iterative procedure known as the Power method.
For a discussion of this procedure see Wilkinson (1965).
It is useful to compare the Invariant and the Liebowitz-Palmer methods. Both of them
calculate a positive eigenvector of an appropriately corrected matrix of citations. The
Liebowitz-Palmer method calculates the positive eigenvector of the matrix A−1C, while
the Invariant method calculates the positive eigenvector of the matrix A−1CD−1A.T h e
entry cij/ai of the matrix A−1C is the average number of citations that an article in journal
i gets from journal j. This is the underlying measure of direct impact (of a typical article
in i on a typical article in j) that the Liebowitz-Palmer method takes into account. The
Invariant method controls for citation intensity by dividing the value cij/ai by
 
k ckj/aj,
that is, by the average length of the list of references of the articles in j. Therefore, the
measure of direct impact of journal i on journal j that underlies the Invariant method is
the average number of citations of an article in i out of the average number of citations by
a typical article of j.
Note that both the Liebowitz-Palmer and the Invariant methods assign to journal i a
value that is a weighted average of some function of the citations it gets: vi =
 
j∈J αijvj.
For the Invariant method, αij =
cij/ai
cj/aj , while for the Liebowitz-Palmer method, αij =
cij/ai
 Cv  .
According to these measures, not all citations have the same value. Citations by important
journals are more valuable than citations by less important journals. But the importance
of a journal is determined endogenously and simultaneously with the importance of all
other journals.
9That is, φLP(J,a,P) is a non-zero vector that solves A−1Cv = λv for some λ.
10It is clear that one can think of an inﬁnite number of ranking methods, the above exam-
ples being just a few. In applications, it would be desirable to choose an appropriate one.
What is appropriate, however, depends on the diﬀerent properties that the ranking method
may satisfy. Therefore, in order to analyze and distinguish among diﬀerent methods, we
should evaluate the properties that each one satisﬁes. Next, we follow this approach and
characterize a ranking method by means of some basic, desirable properties.
The ﬁrst property we consider is anonymity. It says that the ranking of a set of journals
should not depend on the names of the journals. Recall that a permutation matrix is a
(0,1)-matrix that has exactly one 1 in each row and each column.
Deﬁnition 3 A ranking method φ satisﬁes anonymity if for all ranking problems R =
 J,a,C  and for all |J|×| J| permutation matrices P, φ(J,Pa,PCP T)=Pφ(J,a,C).


























That is, a permutation of the matrix of citations results in the same permutation of the
valuations.
In order to motivate the next property, consider a ranking problem  J,a,C  where
for each journal j ∈ J, journal j’s list of references is given by the vector ¯ cj =( cij)i∈J.
The vector ¯ cj represents journal j’s opinions about the journals in J. These opinions are
given by the ratios cij/ckj of citations by j to the diﬀerent journals. These opinions do not
change if journal j were to modify the number of references by multiplying it by a constant
λj > 0, thus turning the vector ¯ cj into the vector λj¯ cj. The second property requires from
the ranking method that it not be aﬀected by such changes. If there is no change in the
journal’s opinions, the ranking should not change. In other words, all else equal, the length
of the reference section should not matter.
Deﬁnition 4 A ranking function φ satisﬁes invariance with respect to citation intensity if
for every ranking problem  J,a,C  and for every non-negative, non-zero diagonal matrix
Λ=d i a g ( λj)j∈J, φ(J,a,CΛ) = φ(J,a,C).


























The idea behind this property is that, given the content of a journal, each article should
have one vote. If an article in journal j cites many articles in diﬀerent journals, then that
article’s vote is divided among the cited journals. Making an analogy, given the content
of a paper, the value of a paper is distributed among its coauthors. All else equal, the
greater the number of coauthors, the smaller the credit each one gets. That is, the value
of a paper cannot be modiﬁed by leaving intact its content and changing the number of
authors.
Recall that given a matrix of citations C, the matrix D of number of cited references
has the total number of citations by each of the journals as its main diagonal. Therefore,
the matrix A−1D has the journals’ citation intensities, (ci/ai)i∈J, as its main diagonal. The
next two properties concern problems where all journals have the same citation intensity,
namely where A−1D = κI for some λ>0. Such problems will be called homogeneous.T h e
next property we examine is motivated by the analysis in Stigler, Stigler, and Friedland
(1995).
Deﬁnition 5 The ranking function φ satisﬁes weak homogeneity if there is α>0 (that
may depend on {i,j} but not on a nor C), such that for all homogeneous and isoarticle
two-journal problems R =  {i,j},a,C , φi(R)/φj(R)=αcij/cji.W e s a y t h a t φ satisﬁes
homogeneity if the above condition holds for all homogeneous two-article problems, not
necessarily isoarticle ones.
This property says that in two-journal problems where both journals have the same
number of articles and the same citation intensity, the relative valuation of a journal should
be proportional to the ratio of their mutual citations.
12The following diagram exempliﬁes this property:
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The value cij is a measure of i’s direct inﬂuence on j.T h u s ,t h er a t i ocij/cji represents
the direct inﬂuence of journal i on journal j relative to the direct inﬂuence of journal j
on journal i. The importance of these ratios was stressed in Stigler, Stigler, and Friedland
(1995), where these sender-receiver ratios, as they call them, were calculated for a group
of nine core journals. In building a desirable ranking method, however, one would like to
take into account not only the direct inﬂuence of each journal on each of the others, but
also the indirect inﬂuence as well. This is why these ratios, though conveying important
information, are not, per se, a perfect index of the journals’ total impact. In a two-
journal problem, however, the ratio cij is a measure of the total impact of journal i on
journal j. Stigler, Stigler, and Friedland (1995) admit that “[t]hese sender-receiver ratios
are inﬂuenced by the varying number of citations in articles published by each journal.”
They are not clear, however, as to whether that variation calls for correction. In any case,
our weak homogeneity property requires that the ratio of valuations be proportional to
the ratio of mutual citations only in two-journal isoarticle problems where the citation
intensity of each journal is the same. In this way, the varying number of citations and the
eﬀects of indirect inﬂuences across journals are not an issue.
The fourth property will allow us to relate large problems to small problems. Thanks
to this property, if we know how to solve a ranking problem with few journals, we will also
know how to solve problems with a greater number of journals. The idea is to extend a
ranking method of few journals to a ranking method of more journals in a consistent way.
In order to formalize what we mean by consistency, we ﬁrst need some deﬁnitions.
Let R =  J,(ai)i∈J(cij)(i,j)∈J×J  be a ranking problem, and let k be a journal in J.T h e





ij = cij + ckj
cik  
t∈J\{k} ctk
for all i,j ∈ J \{ k}.
13Note that since (cij)(i,j)∈J×J is irreducible,
 
t∈J\{k} ctk > 0, and hence, Rk is well-deﬁned.
Further, (ck
ij)(i,j)∈J×J is itself irreducible.
The reduced problem represents the following situation. Suppose we want to rank
the journals in J and our computer cannot deal with |J|×| J| matrices but only with
(|J|−1) × (|J|−1) matrices. Therefore we need to resize our problem and abstract from
one journal in our data set, say journal k. Still, we are interested in the relative values
of all the remaining journals. If we eliminated journal k from the matrix, namely if we
eliminated the corresponding row and column, we would lose some valuable information.
Therefore, we need to “retouch” the matrix so that the information of the missing journal
is not lost. In the old matrix, ckj was the number of citations to journal k by journal j.I f
we do not want to lose this information, we need to redistribute these citations among the
other journals; the appropriate way to do so is in proportion to the citations (or opinions)
by the missing journal k. In other words, journal j gave credit to journal k in the form
of ckj citations while journal k gave credit to the journals other than k according to the
vector ¯ ck of citations by k. Therefore, if we do not want to lose the information about the
indirect impact of each of the journals in J \{ k} on J \{ k}, we need to redistribute each
of the ckj citations, j ∈ J \{k}, according to the relative impact of the journals on k;t h a t
is in proportion to the values in ¯ ck. If this is the correct method to recover the information
lost by the need to use a smaller matrix, we should expect that our ranking method give,
at least in homogeneous problems, the same relative valuations to the journals in J \{ k}
both when applied either to the original problem or to the modiﬁed, reduced one. This is
the requirement of the next property.
Deﬁnition 6 The ranking function φ satisﬁes weak consistency if for all homogeneous,






for all i,j ∈ J \{ k}.
We say that φ satisﬁes consistency if the above condition holds for all homogeneous prob-
lems, not necessarily isoarticle ones.
The property of consistency requires from a ranking method that the relative valuations
14of the journals of a homogeneous problem not be aﬀected if we apply the method to the
reduced problem with respect to k.
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Note that the 15 citations from journal i to journal k are distributed between i and j in
the proportion 10/20 = cik/cjk of the citations received from k. Similarly, the 9 citations
from j to k are distributed among i and j in the same proportions.
In order to motivate the last property of ranking methods, consider a ranking problem
 J,a,C  and suppose that a journal j ∈ J splits into two identical journals. Speciﬁcally,
j splits into journal (j,1) and journal (j,2), each with aj/2 articles. Further, for these
two new journals to be equivalent, the citations are also split: the vectors of citations
by journals (j,1) and (j,2) to the other journals are equal and given by (cij/2)i =j.A l s o ,
the citations of journal j are equally split: each journal i  = j cites cji/2 times each of
the newly-born journals. Lastly, the self-citations cjj are equally split between the two
journals, giving c(j,α),(j,β) = cj/4 for α,β =1 ,2. For a case of a two-journal problem, this
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We would like this split of journal j not to inﬂuence the ranking of the articles published.
In other words, the old and the new relative rankings should be the same. We formalize
this property next.
Let R =  J,(aj)j∈J,(cij)(i,j)∈J×J  be a ranking problem. Each journal j ∈ J will be
split into Tj ≥ 1 identical journal, denoted (j,tj), for tj =1 ,...T j. With some abuse
15of notation, we shall denote by Tj both the number and the set of “types” of journal j.
The resulting ranking problem is R  =  J ,(aj,tj)j∈J,tj∈Tj,(c 
(i,ti)(j,tj))((i,ti),(j,tj))∈J ×J   where
J  = {(j,tj):j ∈ J,tj ∈ Tj}, aj,tj = aj/Tj and c 
(i,ti)(j,tj) =
cij
TiTj. We will call the problem
R  a split of R, and we will denote its citation matrix (c 
(i,ti)(j,tj))((i,ti),(j,tj))∈J ×J  by C .
As mentioned above, we would expect a split of a journal not to aﬀect the relative
valuations of the articles. This is the requirement imposed by the following property.
Deﬁnition 7 A ranking method φ satisﬁes invariance to splitting of journals if for all
ranking problems R =  J,(aj)j∈J,(cij)(i,j)∈J×J , for all i,j ∈ J and for all its splittings
R  =  J ,(aj,tj)j∈J,tj∈Tj,(c 
(i,ti)(j,tj))((i,ti),(j,tj))∈J ×J  ,w eh a v e :
φi(R)/φj(R)=φi,ti(R
 )/φj,tj(R
 ) ∀i,j ∈ J and ∀ti ∈ Ti and tj ∈ Tj.
We are now ready to characterize the only ranking method that satisﬁes all the prop-
erties described above.
Theorem 1 There is a unique ranking method that satisﬁes anonymity, invariance to cita-
tion intensity, weak homogeneity, weak consistency, and invariance to splitting of journals.
It is the Invariant method φI.
Proof : We ﬁrst show that the Invariant method satisﬁes the stated properties. Later
we will show that no other method satisﬁes all these properties simultaneously.
The Invariant method satisﬁes invariance to citation intensity since it chooses
an eigenvector of a matrix which is similar to the normalized matrix of citations.
To see that this method satisﬁes anonymity, let P be a permutation matrix and
assume that v∗ solves A−1CD−1Av = v. We need to show that Pv∗ solves














To see that it satisﬁes homogeneity, and a fortiori weak homogeneity, let R =  J,a,C  be
16a two-journal problem such that A−1D = κI.T h a ti s ,D = κdiag(ai,a j)a n d
C =
 
κai − c21 c12




















c12+c21 , and the result follows.
Let us next show that φI also satisﬁes consistency (and, a fortiori, weak consistency).
Let R =  J,a,C  be a homogeneous problem and let (v∗
i)i∈J = φI(R). That is (v∗
i)i∈J











ici for all i ∈ J. (1)
Now let k ∈ J and let Rk =  J \{ k},(ai)i∈J\{k},Ck  be the reduced problem with






i∈J cij = cj for all i ∈ J \{ k}.D e n o t i n g ( A|k) = diag(ai)i∈J\{k} and
















ici for all i ∈ J \{ k}.




















































































Finally, we shall show that the Invariant method satisﬁes invariance to splitting of
journals. Let R =  J,a,C  be a ranking problem and let R  =  J ,a  ,C   be a splitting
of R,w h e r eJ  = {(j,tj):j ∈ J,tj ∈ Tj}, a 












vj, for all i ∈ J.









vj,tj, for all (i,ti) ∈ J × Ti.






























w h i c hi sw h a tw ew a n t e dt op r o v e .
We shall show next that a ranking method that satisﬁes the ﬁve axioms must be the
Invariant method. The method of proof is the following. We ﬁrst show that any ranking
method that satisﬁes anonymity, invariance to citation intensity, and weak homogeneity
must coincide with the Invariant method in two-journal isoarticle problems. Later, we use
weak consistency to extend this result to all isoarticle problems. Lastly, we use invariance
to splitting of journals to extend the result to all ranking problems.
Lemma 1 Let φ : R→∆ be a ranking method that satisﬁes anonymity, invariance
to citation intensity, and weak homogeneity. Then, for every two-journal problem R =
 {i,j},a,C  such that ai = aj, φ(R) is the vector of valuations awarded by the Invariant
method.
Proof :L e t R =  {i,j},a,C  be the a ranking problem such that ai = aj. We need to
show that φ(R)=( cij/(cij+cji),c ji/(cij+cji)=φI(R). By invariance to citation intensity,
we can assume that the entries of each column of C add up to one. By weak homogeneity,





We will show that α = 1. To see this, consider the auxiliary ranking problem R  =






















19where the second equality follows from the particular choice of the matrix C . Therefore,





which, together with φi(R)+φj(R) = 1, implies the desired result. ✷
The next Lemma allows us to determine the method for all isoarticle problems.
Lemma 2 Let φ : R→∆ be a ranking method that satisﬁes weak homogeneity and weak
consistency, and that coincides with the Invariant method for all two-journal, isoarticle
problems. Then, φ coincides with the Invariant method for all isoarticle problems.
Proof : The proof is by induction on the number of journals. Assume that φ coincides
with the Invariant method for all n-journal problems in which all journals have the same
number of articles, and let R =  J,a,C  be an n + 1 journal problem in that class.
Since both φ and φI satisfy invariance to citation intensity, we can assume without loss
of generality that the entries of each column of C add up to one. For all k ∈ J we have












for all i,j ∈ J.
This implies that φ(R)=φI(R). ✷
In order to complete the proof, we need to show that if φ satisﬁes all the axioms and
coincides with the Invariant method for all isoarticle ranking problems, then φ is in fact
the Invariant method.
Let R =  J,(aj)j∈J,(cij)(i,j)∈J×J  be a ranking problem and let A =d i a g ( aj)j∈J.L e t
φ be a ranking method that satisﬁes all the foregoing axioms. We need to show that
φ(R) solves the equation Av = CD−1Av.D e ﬁ n e v∗ ∈ ∆J to be the only solution to
CD−1v = v.T h a ti s ,v∗ would be the vector of relative valuations awarded by the Invariant
method if all the journals in J had the same number of articles. We need to show that
20φ(R)= A−1v∗
 A−1v∗ .L e t G be the greatest common divisor of (aj)j∈J and let Tj = aj/G.
We will split each journal j ∈ J into Tj identical journals. The set of journals will be
J  = {(j,tj):j ∈ J,tj ∈ Tj}. The number of articles of journal (j,tj), for j ∈ J, tj ∈ Tj,
is given by a(j,tj) = aj/Tj = G. The new matrix of citations is C  =( c 
(i,ti)(j,tj))w h e r e
c 
(i,ti)(j,tj) = cij/(TiTj). Summarizing, R  =  J ,(aj,tj)j∈J,tj∈Tj,(c 
(i,ti)(j,tj))((i,ti),(j,tj))∈J ×J  .
Since R  is a ranking problem where all journals have the same number of articles,
we know by Lemma 2 that φ(R ) is the solution to C D −1v = v,w h e r eC D −1 is the
normalization of C . Denote this unique solution by ¯ v.N o t et h a t¯ v is a |J |-dimensional
vector. However, by anonymity of f, we know that ¯ v(i,ti) =¯ v(i,si) for all i ∈ J and for
all ti,s i ∈ Ti. That is, an article published in sub-journal (i,ti) has the same value as an
article published in the sub-journal (i,si). Denote this common value by ¯ vi, i ∈ J.W e
shall show that, for all i ∈ J, Ti¯ vi =
 
j∈J Tj¯ vjcij/cj.
To see this, note that





























Therefore, ¯ viTi = v∗







for all i ∈ J.
This means that the vectors A−1v∗ and (¯ vi)i∈J are proportional. But by the invariance of
f to splitting of journals, we know that the vectors φ(R)a n d( ¯ vi)i∈J are proportional too,
which implies that A−1v∗ and φ(R) are proportional. Since  φ(R)  =1 ,w em u s th a v e
φ(R)= A−1v∗
 A−1v∗ . ✷
212.2 Independence of the Axioms
This subsection shows that the four axioms used in the above characterization are logically
independent.
In order to see that the weak homogeneity axiom is not implied by the other four,
consider the Egalitarian method φE : R→∆d e ﬁ n e db yφE(J,a,C)=( 1 /|J|,...,1/|J|)T.
It is easy to check that φE satisﬁes anonymity, invariance to citation intensity, consistency
and invariance to splitting of journals, but it does not satisfy weak homogeneity.
We will now build a ranking method that satisﬁes all axioms except for weak consis-
tency. Let R =  J,a,C  be a ranking problem. We say that journal i ∈ J is similar to
journal j ∈ J if, ci,k/ci,s = cj,k/cj,s and ck,i/cs,i = ck,j/cs,j for all k,s ∈ J. The similarity re-
lation is an equivalence relation. Therefore it partitions the set of journals into equivalence
classes. Denote by [i] the equivalence class that contains i ∈ J and consider a ranking prob-








tj∈[j] ctitj.T h a ti s ,
the ranking problem R2 is obtained from R by merging all the journals that are similar to
each other. Repeat the process starting from R2 until the limiting ranking problem R∞ has
no two journals that are similar to each other. Consider the ranking method φSC : R→∆
deﬁned as follows. Given a ranking problem R =  J,a,C  let ˜ R =  J,a,CD−1  be the
associated normalized problem and let ˜ R∞ be the problem that results from the above
merging of similar journals, applied to the normalized problem. The method φSC assigns
to each journal i ∈ J av a l u evi = λv∗
[i],w h e r ev∗
[i] is the value awarded to the equivalence
class that contains i ∈ J by the Modiﬁed Counting method when applied to the problem
˜ R∞ and λ is chosen so that (vi)i∈J ∈ ∆J. This method satisﬁes invariance to citation
intensity since it applies the Modiﬁed Counting method to the normalized problem. It can
be checked that it satisﬁes weak homogeneity and anonymity. It also satisﬁes invariance
to splitting of journals, because by splitting a journal one gets similar subjournals. This
method, however, does not satisfy weak consistency.
To see that anonymity is not implied by the other axioms, let σ : J→I N be a non-
constant function such that if (i,ti) is a replica of i ∈Jthen σ(i)=σ(i,ti). For each J let
HJ =d i a g ( σ(j))j∈J. The function φσ assigns to each ranking problem R =  J,a,C ,t h e
10To be accurate, J2 ⊆ J contains exactly one element of each of the equivalence classes.
22unique solution v ∈ ∆J to A−1(CD−1)AHJv = HJv. By its own deﬁnition, the method
φσ satisﬁes invariance to citation intensity. It can be checked that it also satisﬁes weak
homogeneity: for all relevant problems R =  J,a,C ,
(φσ)i(R)/(φσ)j(R)=αcij/cji,
where α = σi/σj. The proof that this method satisﬁes consistency is analogous to the
proof that the Invariant method satisﬁes consistency. This method also satisﬁes invariance
to splitting of journals. The method φσ does not satisfy anonymity.
To see that the invariance to citation intensity axiom is not implied by the others,
consider the Liebowitz-Palmer method: it satisﬁes anonymity, homogeneity, consistency
and invariance to splitting of journals, but does not satisfy invariance to citation intensity.
To see that it satisﬁes anonymity, let P be a permutation matrix and assume that v∗ solves
A−1Cv = λv,w h e r eλ =  A−1Cv∗  is the maximal eigenvalue of C. We need to show that










which means that Pv∗ is a maximal eigenvector of (P TA−1P)(PCPT). The fact that this







λ1 − c21 c12
c21 λ2 − c12
 
we have A−1C(c12,c 21)T = κ(c12,c 21)T.
To see that the Liebowitz-Palmer method satisﬁes consistency, let (v∗
i)i∈J = φLP(R).
That is (v∗




The rest of the proof is analogous to the proof that the Invariant method satisﬁes consis-
tency. The proof that this method satisﬁes invariance to splitting of journals is similar to
the analogous proof for the Invariant method, and is left to the reader.
23Lastly, consider the ranking method φ : R→∆d e ﬁ n e db yφ(J,a,C) is the only eigen-
vector in ∆J of the matrix (A2)−1CD−1A2. This method satisﬁes anonymity, invariance to
citation intensity, weak homogeneity and weak consistency. It does not satisfy invariance
to splitting of journals.
3 Illustrations
We have examined the problem of ranking journals according to the impact of the articles
they publish. The formal problem is identical to that of evaluating courts and judges based
on the impact of the decisions they make; evaluating innovation and technological change
based on patent citation references to previous patents; ranking of web sites based on their
link structure, and many others problems.
In this section we oﬀer two applications of the Invariant method in the context of
academic journals. We would like to stress that the only purpose of these applications
is to illustrate the use of these methods and to compare them with the results obtained
with other methods. Therefore, any similarities with the “true” rankings, that could be
obtained only by considering the complete set of relevant journals over the relevant period,
is pure coincidence.
We ﬁrst report the Invariant rankings, both overall and per manuscript, in a sample
of 36 journals in economics. The overall impact of a journal is simply its per manuscript
impact multiplied by the number of its articles. We use data of citations during the year
2000 to articles published during the period 1993–1999. The data comes from the 2000
Social Sciences Edition of the Journal Citation Reports published by the Institute for
Scientiﬁc Information.11 The results are shown in Table 1. For both the per-manuscript
and the overall rankings, the table has two columns. One shows the measures when the
Journal of Economic Literature and Journal of Economic Perspectives are included in
the set of journals, and the other column shows the results when both these journals are
excluded from the set of journals. The values are rescaled so that the value of the top
ranked journal equals 100.
11The dataset considers all papers published by these journals including short papers, comments, and
non-refereed articles.
24Table 1
Impact RankingsBas ed on Citationson 2000 to Papersin 1993-1999 – Invariant Method
Per-manuscript ranking Overall Ranking
Econometrica 100.00 100.00 American Economic Review 100.00 100.00
Quarterly Journal of Economics98.72 94.29 Econometrica 87.48 92.26
Journal of Economic Literature 80.47 Quarterly Journal of Economics69.13 69.65
Journal of Political Economy 67.02 65.26 Journal of Political Economy 54.95 56.43
Review of Economic Studies64.10 64.64 Journal of Economic Theory 51.47 55.08
Journal of Monetary Economics44.95 46.14 Review of Economic Studies 38.46 40.90
American Economic Review 37.06 35.13 Gamesand Economic Behavior 32.49 34.91
Journal of Economic Theory 34.40 34.90 Journal of Econometrics31.13 32.48
Gamesand Economic Behavior 31.99 32.59 Journal of Monetary Economics 31.05 33.62
Journal of Economic Perspectives 31.65 Journal of Economics Perspectives 26.63
Journal of Econometrics21.38 21.16 Journal of Economic Literature 24.81
Rand Journal of Economics20.19 19.84 European Economic Review 22.20 23.27
Journal of Labor Economics18.52 13.41 Journal of Public Economics 21.31 22.64
Economic Theory 18.18 18.91 Economic Theory 19.64 21.55
Journal of Human Resources 17.70 13.97 Review of Economics and Statistics 18.41 18.15
Review of Economicsand Statis tics 16.42 15.35 Economic Journal 17.26 17.04
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 16.31 11.43 Econometric Theory 15.37 16.46
Econometric Theory 16.20 16.45 Rand Journal of Economics13.66 14.15
Journal of Public Economics15.95 16.07 International Economic Review 13.38 13.91
International EconomicsReview 15.63 15.42 Journal of Human Res ources 11.80 9.82
Journal of Financial Economics 15.39 17.28 Journal of Bus. and Economics Statistics 11.61 12.51
Journal of Bus. and Economics Statistics 14.63 14.95 Journal of Financial Economics 11.29 13.38
European Economic Review 13.05 12.96 Journal of Economic Dynamicsand Control 11.04 11.67
Journal of Applied Econometrics12.79 13.23 Economics Letters 10.57 11.34
Social Choice and Welfare 12.45 13.01 Journal of Labor Economics10.40 7.94
Journal of Environmental Ecs. and Mgmnt. 12.39 11.34 Journal of Environmental Ecs. and Mgmnt. 9.30 8.98
International Journal of Game Theory 12.18 12.57 Journal of International Economics8.14 6.74
Economic Journal 12.07 11.30 Journal of Mathematical Economics7.55 8.28
Journal of International Economics11.43 8.97 Journal of Ris k and Uncertainty 7.33 5.41
Journal of Economic Dynamicsand Control 10.45 10.47 Social Choice and Welfare 6.73 7.41
Journal of Mathematical Economics10.06 10.46 Journal of Applied Econometrics 6.60 7.20
Economic Inquiry 6.22 5.19 International Journal of Game Theory 6.09 6.62
Journal of Economic Behavior and Org. 5.04 5.10 Journal of Economic Behavior and Org. 6.04 6.45
Scandinavian Journal of Economics4.03 4.12 Economic Inquiry 5.26 4.63
EconomicsLetters 3.08 3.13 Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2.45 2.65
Oxford Business and Economics Statistics 2.77 2.68 Oxford Business and Economics Statistics 1.56 1.59
We are particularly interested in comparing the Invariant methods to other methods, as
well as in calculating the implied impact of individual rather than representative papers.
We illustrate these applications using disaggregated data of the citations given by each
paper published in the year 2000 to every paper published during the period 1993–1999.
Given the high cost involved in looking up and counting citations by hand from a large
number of journals, we just examine a small set of journals.12 The journals we examine are
the top 5 general interest journals obtained from the previous table: Review of Economic
Studies, American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy and
12The required data per article are not available in Journal Citation Reports or, to the best of our
knowledge, in any other electronic database.
25Quarterly Journal of Economics.13 For purposes of comparison, in addition to the per-
manuscript Invariant methods, we also calculate the numerical rankings that result from
other commonly used methods. We will see that the diﬀerences can be substantial. Table
2 ﬁrst shows the aggregate data.
Table 2
Number of citations for ﬁve journals, 2000
# of articles Citing Journal
Cited Journal REStud AER Ecmta JPE QJE
Review of Economic Studies 252 21 24 15 13 10
American Economic Review 577 8 122 10 24 38
Econometrica 369 48 27 57 17 11
Journal of Political Economy 355 18 43 7 31 20
Quarterly Journal of Economics 294 13 73 10 24 53
Total 108 289 99 109 132
The following table shows the measure of overall impact for these journals according
to the Invariant and the overall method introduced by Liebowitz and Palmer (1984).14
Table 3
Overall Impact of Journal Rankings Based on Citations in 2000
Invariant method Overall Liebowitz-Palmer method
1. Econometrica 100.00 1. American Economic Review 100.00
2. American Economic Review 84.39 2. Quarterly Journal of Economics 79.22
3. Quarterly Journal of Economics 81.33 3. Econometrica 51.28
4. Journal of Political Economy 54.72 4. Journal of Political Economy 48.42
5. Review of Economic Studies 43.26 5. Review of Economic Studies 30.55
Note the substantial diﬀerence between the two numerical rankings. While, according
to the Invariant method, Econometrica has substantially more impact than the AER and
the QJE, according to the LP method the overall impact of Econometrica is barely half
13The data we will use in what follows for the American Economic Review excludes the “Papers and
Proceedings” issue published in May.
14This overall method is diﬀerent from the (per-manuscript) Liebowitz-Palmer method discussed in the
previous sections. This method was proposed in Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) as is deﬁned as the maximal
eigenvector of the matrix of citations C.
26that of the AER and close to two thirds that of the QJE. This diﬀerence can be traced back
to the failure of the LP method to satisfy invariance to citation intensity. Table 1 shows
that the AER and QJE together have more cited references (a longer list of references)
than the other three journals. As a result, since the LP method gives more weight to
the opinions of journals with greater citation intensity, this method yields a ranking more
biased toward the opinions of the AER and QJE. Note that these two journals give more
weight to AER and QJE than to the other three.
Table 4 shows the impact per manuscript of each of the ﬁve journals. Note again the
great diﬀerence in the measurement of impact. While QJE and Econometrica have similar
impact according to the Invariant method, according to the Liebowitz-Palmer method a
paper in Econometrica has 63% of the impact of a paper published in the QJE. Again,
the diﬀerences in the numerical rankings are due to the failure of the Liebowitz-Palmer
method to satisfy the invariance axiom.
Table 4
Per-Manuscript Impact of Journal Rankings Based on citations on 2000
Invariant method Liebowitz-Palmer method
1. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100.00 1. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 .00
2. Econometrica 97.96 2. Econometrica 63.60
3. Review of Economic Studies 62.05 3. American Economic Review 55.06
4. Journal of Political Economy 55.72 4. Journal of Political Economy 51.00
5. American Economic Review 52.87 5. Review of Economic Studies 49.05
Lastly, a number of questions of interest require an analysis at the level of individual
rather than representative manuscripts. For instance, in addition to the various issues
mentioned in footnote 2, there is considerable discussion of the possible role of editors in
steering disciplines, pushing or suppressing various lines of research, favoring friends and
personal associates, and others. It also seems clear that articles may vary individually in
quality and inﬂuence, and that not all articles appearing in the same journal, even in the
same issue, are likely to be equally inﬂuential. A journal might, for example, provide the
same impact by publishing all of its papers of similar quality, while another journal may
attain the same overall impact by publishing just a few articles of exceptional quality and
27many of low quality.15 The Invariant method can also be used to calculate the impact
of individual articles. The average value of an article published in journal i is, according




cj/aj vj. Therefore, the value of a particular paper pi




cj/ajvj. Namely, the impact-adjusted sum of
the citations of paper pi. Note that the average impact of a paper in journal i may be
greater than that of a paper in journal j, while a citation from journal j may be more




As an example, the following are the top ten papers in our sample according to the
Invariant method:
Table 5
Top ten impact-adjusted cited articles, 2000
Cited Article Impact
Benabou (1996) 3.02
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) 3.01
Ellison (1993) 2.90
Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) 2.90
Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) 2.83
Rabin (1993) 2.83
Galor and Tsiddon (1997) 2.79
Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) 2.76
Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) 2.74
Piketty (1995) 2.71
Note that although, on average, a paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics has
more impact than a paper in the American Economic Review, the paper with most impact
in our sample appeared in the AER. Also note that although a paper published in the
QJE has more impact that one published in Econometrica, a citation from Econometrica
is more valuable than a citation from QJE. This is so because the average paper in QJE
has a longer reference list, thus awarding each of its cited references a small proportion of
its value.16
15It would then be relevant to examine diﬀerences across journals in the degree of inequality in the
distribution of inﬂuence of the articles in the journal, using inequality criteria base on normalized stochastic
dominance. Any diﬀerence may reﬂect, at least in part, diﬀerences in risk-taking behavior or other aspects
of the tastes of the editors.
16The references for these papers are: R. Benabou (1996), “Heterogeneity, Stratiﬁcation, and Growth:
284 Concluding Remarks
We have examined the problem of measuring inﬂuence using the information contained in
the communication between scholarly publications. The same problem arises in the analysis
of the basing of judicial decisions on previous decisions, the analysis of the dynamics
of innovation where patent records contain citation references to previous patents and
discoveries, in the World Wide Web where search engines rank web pages according to
their importance, and in other areas. The information provided by these communications
is important. It allows us to make rigorous quantitative analyses of elusive but important
phenomena, such as reputation, inﬂuence, the diﬀusion of scientiﬁc knowledge, the quality
of journals, the productivity of scholars, changes in the publication process and in the
returns and incentives for publication, several aspects of the labor market for scientists,
personnel decisions in academic administration, and many others. Yet, the actual use of
this information has been conducted without any use of theoretical methodologies that
could help us understand the content in these communications. In particular, simple
citation counts and a number of arbitrary methods have been widely employed in the
measurement of inﬂuence and in applications.
The result of these arbitrary practices is that the information content of the network
communications that play a paramount role in the exchange, dissemination, and certiﬁ-
cation of knowledge and information is little understood. This, in turn, has important
implications for all the empirical applications mentioned above.
In this paper we apply the axiomatic methodology to bear on the problem of measuring
inﬂuence based on communication data, and characterize diﬀerent measurement methods
according to the properties that they satisfy and those that they do not satisfy. We obtain
Macroeconomic Implications of Community Structure and School Finance,” AER, pp. 584-609; P. Milgrom
and C. Shannon (1994), “Monotone Comparative Statics,” Econometrica, pp. 157-180; G. Ellison (1993),
“Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination,” Econometrica, pp. 1047-1071; C. Juhn, K. M. Murphy,
and B. Pierce (1993), “Wage Inequality and the Rise in Returns to Skill,” JPE, pp. 410-442; D. H.
Autor, L. F. Katz, and A. B. Krueger (1998), “Computing Inequality: Have Computers Changed the
Labor Market?,” QJE, pp. 1169-1213; M. Rabin (1993), “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and
Economics,” AER, pp. 1281-1302; O. Galor and D. Tsiddon (1997), “Technological Progress, Mobility,
and Economic Growth,” AER, pp. 363-382; E. L. Glaeser, B. Sacerdote, and J. A. Scheinkman (1996),
“Crime and Social Interactions,” QJE, pp. 507-548; P. Bolton and M. Dewatripont (1994), “The Firm as
a Communication Network,” QJE, pp. 809-839; T. Piketty (1995), “Social Mobility and Redistributive
Politics,” QJE, pp. 551-584.
29that a unique ranking method can be characterized by certain basic properties.
Lastly, we would like to stress that the analysis of communication data cannot be a
substitute for critical reading and expert judging, but rather a complement. The commu-
nication between scholarly journals, legal opinions, patents, web pages, and other publica-
tions contains valuable information that can be used to address several empirical questions
of interest. We have argued that we should ask why a given methodology to measure
inﬂuence is reasonable and informative.
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